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NOTES
In the instant decision the Supreme' Court considered and re-
jected the arguments which, in the past, have been successful
in preventing its use. The decision should at long last put an
end to recurring litigation over the constitutionality of the
statute.20
Sidney B. Galloway
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DUE PROCESS OF LAW-FLUORIDATION
OF WATER SUPPLY BY CITY
The Shreveport City Council adopted a resolution authori-
zing the fluoridation of the city water supply as a means of
combating tooth decay in children. The plaintiffs, as residents,
citizens, taxpayers, and purchasers of water from the city, sought
to enjoin the fluoridation, contending (1) that the contemplated
action was not authorized by the city's charter, and (2). that
even if authorized by the charter, the measure was neverthe-
less repugnant to the due process and equal protection clauses
of the fourteenth amendment. The trial court issued the in-
junction, stating that the measure was strictly within the realm
of private dental hygiene and bore no reasonable relation to the
public health. On appeal, held, reversed. The city's fluoridation
of its water supply did bear a reasonable relation to the general
health and welfare of the community, was therefore authorized
by the city's charter, and violated neither the due process nor
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Chapman
v. City of Shreveport, 225 La. 859, 74 So.2d 142 (1954).
Concerning the constitutionality of state legislation enacted
for the public health and welfare, the Supreme Court of the
United States has stated: "Even if the wisdom of the policy
be regarded as debatable and its effects uncertain, still the legis-
lature is entitled to its judgment."' In accordance with this
view, the Court has upheld a state statute providing for the
sterilization of idiots to prevent an increase in the number of
20. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co. v. Elbert, 75 Sup. Ct. 151 (1954),
decided the same day as the Watson case, also settled an issue concerning
the Louisiana direct action statute which has often been involved in litiga-
tion. Federal jurisdiction was upheld on the ground that the "matter in con-
troversy . . . is between: (1) Citizens of different States" (28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)
(1952) ) whenever an out-of-state insurer is sued directly (without joinder
of the insured) by a Louisiana citizen, regardless of the fact that the
insured wrongdoer is also a Louisiana citizen.
1. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937).
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potential criminals and wards of the state.2 Similarly, com-
pulsory vaccination to protect the public against communicable
disease has been upheld.3 The Court has also declared consti-
tutional state legislation fixing maximum hours of work for
women, reasoning that "the physical well-being of woman be-
comes an object of public interest and care in order to preserve
the strength and vigor of the race."'4 The decisions of the Lou-
isiana Supreme Court show a similar deference to the judgment
of the legislature.' The courts in three other jurisdictions have
refused to invalidate fluoridation measures similar to the one
involved in the instant case." In those cases, a prominent issue
was whether or not fluoridation of water supplies is an inter-
ference with freedom of religion that violates the fourteenth
amendment. In none of them did the court hold that it is. The
Supreme Court of the United States has refused to review the
decision in this case and another. 7
The major portion of the court's opinion in the instant case
seems to deal with the validity of the fluoridation measure
under the city charter provision authorizing the city to legislate
for the health of its inhabitants.8 The court discussed this ques-
tion in terms of the "reasonableness" of the relation between
fluoridation of the city water supply and the public health. The
court also regarded the validity of the measure under the four-
teenth amendment as depending upon its "reasonableness." As
a result, it is not clear in certain portions of the opinion con-
cerning the "reasonableness" of the measure whether the court
is dealing with the city's power to fluoridate the water supply
under the terms of its charter or instead with the constitu-
tionality of the charter insofar as it gives the city such power.9
2. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
3. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
4. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421, 422 (1908).
5. Shreveport v. Conrad, 212 La. 737, 33 So.2d 503 (1947); New Orleans
v. Shick, 167 La. 674, 120 So. 47 (1929); State ex rel. Civello v. New Orleans,
154 La. 271, 97 So. 440 (1923); State v. McCormick, 142 La. 580, 77 So. 288
(1917); State ex rel. City of Lake Charles v. St. Louis Ry., 138 La. 714, 70
So. 621 (1915).
6. de Aryan v. Butler, 119 Cal. App.2d 674, 260 P.2d 98 (1953), cert.
denied, 347 U.S. 1012 (1954); Kraus v. City of Cleveland, 121 N.E.2d 311
(Ohio 1954), affirming 116 N.E.2d 779 (Ct. Comm. P1. Ohio 1953); Dowell v.
Tulsa, 273 P.2d 859 (Okla. 1954).
7. Chapman v. City of Shreveport, 75 Sup. Ct. 216 (1954); de Aryan v.
Butler, 119 Cal. App.2d 674, 260 P.2d 98 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1012
(1954).
8. CITY CHARTER OF SHREVEPORT § 2.01.
9. For example, the court said, "The plan for fluoridation, therefore,
bears a reasonable relation to the general welfare and the general health
of the community, and is a valid exercise of the power conferred by Section
NOTES
Uncertainty also exists to some extent with respect to the
court's treatment of the equal protection issue in the case. This
question was presented by the fact that all persons in the city
were virtually forced to consume fluoridated water and bear
the expense of the fluoridation although only children of certain
ages derived any immediate benefit from the program. This
issue is somewhat similar to the question of whether the fluori-
dation was a health measure designed to benefit the entire
public and not an unauthorized invasion of the realm of private
health for the benefit of a limited class, which the trial court
had held it was. The court found that the problems of dental caries
in children properly falls within the domain of public health
by reason of "its seriousness as affecting the health and well
being of the community.""' The court reasoned that, since the
"children of today are the adult citizens of tomorrow" who must
eventually maintain the government, legislation which reduces
dental caries among them is "beneficial to all citizens."1 1 The
court did not consider fluoridation of the city water supply an
improper means for achieving this end, referring to vital sta-
tistics from other communities where fluorides are naturally
present in the water supply and to the opinion of "respectable
medical authority.' 2 The court disposed of plaintiff's argument
that the measure violated the equal protection clause with a
quotation from a decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States stating that "in the exercise of the police power reason-
able classification may be freely applied" and that legislation
does not violate the equal protection clause "merely because it
is not all-embracing.' 3 The court also found that fluoridation
of the city's water supply was neither arbitrary, oppressive, nor
unreasonable, and consequently did not offend the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment.
How do the objectives of the legislation challenged in the
instant case compare to those of the statutes involved in simi-
lar decisions of the United State Supreme Court? The public's
experience with epidemics made the public interest served by
the compulsory vaccination statute an obvious one.' 4 Sterili-
zation of idiots to prevent the procreation of potentially unde-
2.01 of the charter if it is not arbitrary or unreasonable." Chapman v. City
of Shreveport, 225 La. 859, 870, 74 So.2d 142, 146 (1954).
10. Id. at 870, 74 So.2d at 146.
11. Id. at 870, 74 So.2d at 145.
12. Id. at 870, 74 So.2d at 146.
13. Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 177 (1922).
14. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
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sirable citizens conferred a more speculative but nevertheless
demonstrable benefit upon the public. 15 The same may be said
of the regulation of women's hours of employment.' 6 Compared
to these statutes, the benefit conferred upon the public gen-
erally by the fluoridation of water supplies seems remote and
conjectural to the writer. It also seems that the means employed
by the city to achieve its purpose in the instant case have a
somewhat broader sweep than the statutes involved in these
decisions. The remedy in the sterilization case was narrowly
tailored to fit only those persons who, upon proper medical
examination, had been found to contribute to the evil sought
to be eradicated. No other member of the public was sterilized.
Regulation of women's hours of work was similarly directed
at the source of the evil, women's contracts of employment, to
which employers were necessarily parties. In the field of com-
pulsory vaccination, the entire public is subjected to vaccina-
tion, but every member of the public is a potential carrier of
disease. The fluoridation measure in the instant case, while
aimed at the prevention of dental caries in children, subjected
not only children to the treatment, but other members of the
public who in no way contributed to the evil. Nevertheless,
the Louisiana Supreme Court did not find the measure arbi-
trary, oppressive, or unreasonable. It is interesting to note that
the legislation in the instant case was not challenged specifi-
cally as an invasion of freedom of religion.
J. Bennett Johnston, Jr.
CONTRACTS-CoNSIDERATION-PRoMIssoRY ESTOPPEL
Plaintiff employees of defendant bus company were covered
by a collective bargaining agreement providing for vacation pay
and sick leave with pay, and also by a company-sponsored retire-
ment plan. Under these programs, sick leave and retirement
benefits accumulated from year to year. Defendant, in accordance
with its plan to sell its buses and other equipment, appeared
before the City Council of High Point, North Carolina, to obtain
approval of the sale. In the presence of plaintiffs' representatives,
defendant's attorney verbally promised' to pay plaintiffs an
15. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
16. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
1. Defendant contended that no promise was made at all, but the court
assumed for purposes of the opinion that the promise was made.
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